Development of Agriculture in the Republic of India
Christopher Clayton
05/04/2011
The government of India oversaw a time of improved agriculture. However, its policies created many other problems, which eventually resulted in lower growth over time, undermining a primary social goal. Farm cooperatives appeared before the Green Revolution, but they did not aid small farmers effectively into that period. Instead, they served mainly to enrich the upper echelons of rural society. Village power structures in general worked against the poor as well. Dairy cooperatives fared better than their crop-based counterparts in results to some extent, but they have also had their own issues. New agricultural technology and high yield variety seeds appeared to be a way to increase poor farmers’ wealth, but they fell at a number of disadvantages. They especially faced difficulty getting into the new market at all. Promotion of Eucalyptus trees serves as an example of the government’s over-optimistic endeavors throughout agricultural change. The attempt at creating a new path for the consumer agricultural market generally resulted in more social and environmental problems than should have occurred, and they could have been prevented with foresight. Agricultural revolution in India attempted to tackle large concerns, but created equally large social and environmental issues.
In spite of initial growth rate increases, uneven regional attention by the government and environmental effects due to narrow goals gave way to decline and social problems. Punjab and Haryana especially saw the government pushing for high-yield variety seeds, but by the mid-80’s, production growth-rate and wheat yields began to fall (Nellithanam, Nellithanam, 930). Further national output problems resulted because Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh had received more attention than other states. On top of this, bigger farmers received more attention in general than the middle and small strata. The government spent more and more on subsidies, such as on irrigation technology and pesticides, but it could not keep up with increasing demand. It attempted to handle too much by itself, instead of allowing other sectors more participation. Pump electricity expenses especially increased over time because of the need for deeper and deeper wells, which outstripped water supplies beyond natural refill times (Nellithanam, Nellithanam, 931). The Coromandel plains serve as an example of these types of problems. After the adoption of HYV rice seeds and fertilizer, the development of reliable water supplies and the digging of deeper wells at the end of the 1972-84 period, rice production increased by 38% (Harriss-White, Janakarajan, 1470). Small farmers in 1983 saw a gain of 43%, but those with less than one hectare only gained by 7%. Even so, small farmers also did not grow much more than large farms as a whole, in spite of their greater numbers, on top of the poorest benefitting least. Raw production increases themselves also do not completely indicate real prosperity. More wells were needed in the 1980’s because 58% of cultivated land had become irrigated (Harriss-White, Janakarajan, 1471). However, problems arose with this growth because drought was not controlled effectively. The economy of the region clearly could not handle that much irrigation. As a result of this unchecked use of water without greater efficiency or other improvements, average land holdings shrank to one hectare. Attempts to improve raw production thus resulted in real wealth decline. Declining well depth was also responsible for both drinking and irrigation water cost increases, and investments to improve the situation became more expensive to make (Harriss-White, Janakarajan, 1472). Rice production became unstable such that select villages in 1993-94 were producing 3.5 tons, compared to eleven villages in 1973-74 at 3.2 tons. In this way, there wasn’t much of an economic gain at all. Madhya Pradesh provides a further example. The state introduced soybean into monsoon planting, which replaced many crops such as various cereals and oilseeds, creating soil erosion, lack of plant diversity and nutrition concerns (Nellithanam, Nellithanam, 931). Even if more food was produced, consumers and those subsisting alike clearly did not benefit in every other way. Production goals were ultimately thwarted as well due to high costs, which resulted in less than the majority of agricultural land being irrigated by 1995. Thus production growth in itself, the central concern, did not stay consistent, along with other problems existing. In order to help reduce some of these trends, Kisani Samvardhan Kendra attempted to revert to traditional practices in the Malwa region. This strategy was based on research that plants absorb much of their water through rainwater in the soil, which HYV seed plants could not reach due to having shallow roots. They brought non-HYV seeds from Dewas, after managing to find them, to Indore for Sarvodaya Shikshan Samiti to plant, in comparison with Sujata HYV wheat. Using proper growth strategies, results showed that non-irrigated wheat cost less to produce and turned a higher profit than HYV, even after subsidies (Nellithanam, Nellithanam, 932). This provides economic criticism against the government for overzealous use of new seeds without corresponding precautions and planting strategies, such as using a mix of seed types. One argument suggests that agrarian conflict increased in the 70’s because of concentration on raw production gains while the rich took most of them (Oommen, 99). However, a counter-argument suggests that conflict by the poor in response wasn’t directly because of the revolution, because the middle strata were the ones who felt most deprived due to their perception of the situation. A direct link between the revolution and rebellion is also argued against because Punjab, the greatest output region, only had three rebellions from 1967-68 (Oommen, 101). Rice-growing regions suffered the most conflict, in spite of wheat-growing regions being the main target of the revolution. Punjab also had lower numbers of unemployed worker days per month, and smaller numbers of landless laborers, which may have led to less dissatisfaction. However, even if the Green Revolution was not directly responsible for direct conflict, it still created problems, especially for the lowest classes of society. It did not help existing problems either, and did not spread awareness among the lower classes as well. They needed it the most, but were not the main target for increasing well-being and consciousness in practice. Agricultural growth rates fell, on top of previous difficulties, from 1.5% in 1995 to 1% in 2006 (Overdorf, 0). In this way India continued to have troubles into the 21st century with its agricultural policies. Causes could have included management issues, unpredictable weather, and water shortage, which directly relates to earlier problems previously mentioned. The article also suggests environmental damage from pesticide use and excessive irrigation creating waterlogs. Prime Minister Singh advocated higher farm incomes over raw food production at the time, which demonstrated a new strategy. He also wanted to export fruits and vegetables, and to import wheat and soybeans to make up for a lack in production. However, he also emphasized that India would once again become self-reliant in food. This kind of policy represents a step back because it makes the use of food imports appear bad for the economy, when such measures allow for concentration on other products, and the corresponding jobs could uplift more people. The article proposes that making a push for even more efficient technology towards a national self-sufficiency goal would be ineffective, and instead it should be limited to provinces such as Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, which would benefit the most. Indeed, in this way, past mistakes could be avoided, and it would be a more realistic approach to international economic ties.
Farm cooperatives and other village conditions largely failed to benefit smaller producers and lower castes, especially female members. At first, it appears that cooperatives since the 1950’s and into the Green Revolution should have benefitted poorer people, because the law required a certain number of laborers to build a sense of membership, and the government targeted the poor (Ebrahim, 180). The government attracted them using clear aims and promising benefits. In Gujarat and Maharashtra, cooperatives seemed to benefit such people the most. There were enough middle peasants and middle-status caste members, along with high levels of investment in equipment, which gave incentive for leaders to monitor the productivity of smaller producers (Ebrahim, 181). This suggests that the only way for poorer people to benefit involved richer people taking notice, when they should have been able to improve themselves without such attention. The law clearly did not operate as intended in this way. It also excluded those who did not own shares in cooperatives, because such people could not sell to them (Ebrahim, 182-83). The cooperatives managed to exclude many using financial methods, when the main beneficiaries shouldn’t have had to worry about finance and investment to improve their condition. Middle and large farmers acted as the main participants because of this, when they did not need such organizations as much. Low caste members could be found as members, but only those who amassed a lot of land, again a group which did not need the cooperative as much as others. Small farmer Kshatriyas made gains in 1990’s Gujarat, but in contrast, Patidars in the Bardoli region controlled the sugar cooperatives, in spite of being a 12% minority. Thus, for the most part, cooperatives did not reach as wide of a population as they should have, and benefitted those already with wealth. Landless Halpatis especially suffered because in spite of employment, there were uneven labor requirements and jobs were eliminated by automation, by insecticides replacing weeding, because intense labor was only needed in the second and third crop cycles and because of the importation of migrant labor (Ebrahim, 183). High labor supply also worsened their wages, along with employers lowering shelter, sanitation, rest and nutrition provision standards as a result. In this way the high castes practiced cruelty beyond the way the market devalued their labor. Halpati people tended to become migrants themselves due to such poor conditions, moving to other regions and industries, such as cotton gins, as their only kinds of alternatives. This group clearly did not benefit from cooperatives, and was made worse from it, especially because of the tendency for a lack of job security, and the terrible nature of the work itself. Meanwhile, Patidars further grew from middle-class status to wealthy people because of their use of cotton as a cash crop in cooperatives (Ebrahim, 185). This allowed them to buy commodities such as motorized vehicles, and to have greater political power such as factory cooperative and political party contacts. They could also afford to put women in purdah instead of having them work in the fields. In contrast, Halpati women had to work alongside men for the same work shifts in the same jobs, without receiving a separate wage, due to the labor market and desperate living standards (Ebrahim, 186). This took place alongside household duty responsibilities, forcing them to have two jobs, in essence. To return to the Coromandel plains, village conditions in the 1990’s resulted in 50% of cultivating households converting to landless agricultural labor (Harriss-White, Janakarajan, 1473). They too suffered devolution in living standards and work security due to the way their villages operated. Women especially were affected because their real wages had declined throughout a twenty year period. Meanwhile, in spite of overall land-use troubles, rich households spent even more on fertilizer and agrochemicals, whereas use by the poor remained static. The overuse of such materials also contributed to such social problems in the first place, but their destructiveness continued on a greater scale. They also had more difficulty improving their situation because the rich had better credit rates (12.2% in 1996 compared to 28% for peasants) and had access to more credit (the top 25% owned 85% of formal credit and 48% of informal). Stated purpose, on top of class and caste status, made it more difficult for the poor to obtain credit as well. The government was also not able to regulate credit given by individual traders, so they could charge unfair rates. Raw food intake became less of a problem, but the elite could afford to diversify their food sources (Harriss-White, Janakarajan, 1474). Calorie intake stabilized to 1,900 by 1994, but nutrition varied by 17-35% for the poor. The Ambedkar People’s Movement strove to improve what the government and the large farmers refused to help with by raising consumption through socially redistributive measures such as noon meals, and by controlling rice prices. Unlike cooperatives run by the wealthy and village power-structures in general, organizations from below managed to improve village life to some extent in this region. However, by 1996, half of landed households only claimed one adult in agricultural activity, demonstrating the continued income problems faced by these people. Workers listed as "other", such as construction workers, increased from the 1980’s, but people in scheduled castes were screened out of high-return work (Harriss-White, Janakarajan, 1475). Discrimination made it difficult for the lowest agricultural families to find extra work, on top of general income issues. Women further made less money per unit of labor time than men, and only participated in 8% of non-agricultural activity, adding more issues to household income diversification. In village examples of Karnataka, wealthy farmers running cooperatives also hurt these populations by extending more fertilizer on credit to fellow wealthy farmers, as opposed to smaller ones, denying them opportunities (Dhanagare, 139-140). In Punjab examples, large farms made more income despite not being any more economically productive than others, representing market bias for certain people. Small farmers in these areas had to find non-agricultural work, as in other states, and it represented the majority of household income (Dhanagare, 141). They could not practice their trade even in the majority of their work-time due to the way the rich structured rural society. The economy allowed wages to lag behind a higher cost living and because of a higher supply of laborers, creating a larger gap between rich and poor than before (Dhanagare, 142). For example, real wages may have increased in the 1960’s in Punjab, but people below the poverty line increased (Dhanagare, 143). The government attempted to help into the 1980’s with the National Rural Employment Program, and poverty decline sped up, but it was less noticeable in developed states and in aiding scheduled castes and tribes. The government did not intervene effectively into a prime area for its attention, and helped too late.
Dairy organizations may have improved production and opened new markets, but they did not necessarily run efficiently or aim to improve workers’ situations as well as they claimed to. Controversy began over Operation Flood and the National Dairy Development Board because it had been lasting well into the 1980’s (Baviskar, George, 36). Critics took issue over its concentration on large producers, and so questioned if the landless, small agriculturalists and cultivators, and medium farmers truly benefitted at all. The government and other organizations such as the World Food Programme also only offered praise, and not criticism. In this way the Board only heard what it wanted to by its backers, and so had less reason to improve. Supporters emphasized the raw production gains, and that they occurred with little new input (Baviskar, George, 38). The Board emphasized a singular policy of better farm organization, instead of putting more weight onto alternatives such as cross-breeding cows to increase milk production. It also claimed to help the poor first, but they were explicitly absent in phase two of Operation Flood’s stated plans. On top of this, it also changed stances multiple times under pressure, such as the usefulness imparted on importing European technology, and weather it felt milk was a cash or food crop (Baviskar, George, 39). In this way the program suffered from indecisive leadership. Whenever a program did not work as well as planned, such as cow cross-breeding, it attempted to shift blame onto others, such as the Ministry of Agriculture. It did not stand on its own and responsibly admit mistakes. Instead of limiting its scope to what it was actually doing, it claimed to be a sub-continental organization, even though it mainly based itself on the Anand cooperatives and their above-average performance levels (Baviskar, George, 40). Imaginarily extending itself even more, it claimed to represent other kinds of farmers without having appropriate sub-organizations. It clearly did not want to make more investments when needed to back its claims, or give them up. On a global scale, it accepted international goods and technology, while claiming to be working for Indian self-sufficiency (Baviskar, George, 41). Even though self-sufficiency was not necessarily realistic or good for the economy in terms of efficiency and helping to uplift people, it made such claims while clearly acting differently. Operation Flood II strategies also involved strategies which could only benefit medium and large land-owners in the 80’s. For example, only that group could have the means to artificially inseminate cows for cross-breeds in the first place, in order to create more efficient milk-producers (George, 2164). They were the ones who could take the financial risk of potentially overproducing males as opposed to females. Even without program support, the rich would have gained an advantage over the poor in having greater access to higher-production cows in general. Small producers looking to get into dairy in any case also had to maintain cows, regardless of support, both in fodder and veterinary expenses, and in land, instead of using the land for growing. That excluded landless laborers from the program, on top of low class difficulties in general. In the example of Anand cooperatives, people had to own at least one milk-producing animal and give all milk to the cooperative (George, 2165). Thus, this acted as another economic barrier to entry into the system, on top of the difficulties of maintaining such an animal. Example villages in Kaira, Gujarat also show restrictions based on caste, because the leaders came from certain caste groups. Both wealth and high caste came together in Maharashtra, in sugar cane cooperative leaders making a move into milk (Goerge, 2166). This further demonstrates how the system largely worked against poorer people, and lower castes of various economic statuses. High costs of transportation to cities further affected lower-class people, because of their greater dependence on dairy as their main income source. On an organizational level, Operation Flood had to match local cooperatives’ procurement price to milk producers in order to stay competitive, such as with the Choryasi Taluka Milk Sale Cooperative Society Ltd in Surat, Gujarat (George, 2167). It, for example, eliminated pasteurization and other processes to sell entirely locally at the cheapest price, but Operation Flood tried to expand to such areas anyway, in spite of being economically redundant. Operation Flood also insisted on selling milk in fluid form to cities, rather than in better-preserved ghee dairy form, which had been in use by 1947 (George, 2167, 2168). The market strategy of the movement thus wasn’t very insightful, at least at the time. In Surat, the union cooperative Sumul sparked tension because it kept more money than that due back to the tribal cooperative Rangpura (George, 2167-2168). Organizations themselves directly clashed beyond market competition in this way, bringing question to larger organizations’ practices. By 1993 dairy cooperatives throughout India had grown in number, but not many did well financially (Shah, 125-126). Successes took place, such as in Maharashtra in the late-80’s, when milk production reached Gujarat’s level due to cross-bred cow and buffalo use, and the way cooperatives organized. However, even so, some private cooperatives performed better than they did (Shah, 127). In spite of being one of the high-producing states, only 25% of non-privates were economically viable. This suggests there were issues with management, which can be traced to bureaucratic and political control inefficiencies. In the case of Amul in 1996 in Ravalapura, Gujarat, criticism involved its move deeper into the countryside and its support of rich farmers who could already support cattle (Goldenberg, 2). It was also criticized for switching from basic products to complex ones, such as ice-creams and frozen desserts, which wealthier people largely only could buy. Amul claimed that it had to diversify in order to deal with new consumer situations, which is true to an extent. However, many more people required the basics over other goods, especially in the countryside, so it should have severely limited complex dairy production, or should not have begun it at all at the time. The article notes tension towards the government for restricting cooperatives. However, this does not necessarily excuse cooperatives from not sticking to their fundamental ideals. There also have been cooperatives running without so much controversy. The same article mentions the Kheda cooperative, which gave back 60% of its profits to members. In this way, people had extra income security by being tied to the organization directly, and also had incentive to work well. In the 1980’s in Palana, old traditions fell away, such as people working with untouchables and becoming more trustful of traders (Jones, 10). Leaders were voted in once per year, and women earned direct income from tending cows. However, they also faced conflict with telia rajahs in the oilseed industry, the government, and the US Agency for International Development. In this case the wider world affected a cooperative’s ability to operate from many fronts. In 2006 the West Bengal Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited strove for innovation (The Statesman). It moved to create better products, to increase rural awareness, to invest in a training center and to take part in the Forecasting Assessment Council Project, Clean Milk Project and Women Dairy Development Project. This provides an example of a capital-intensive and government project-oriented way of aiding communities. However, dairy organizations’ historically low population representation and its regional specificity towards the west have made it ineffective for mass social change, on top of their organizational blunders.
HYV seed introduction and new machinery proved difficult for smaller producers to exploit. High investment requirements and high cereal yield costs meant that only wealthy farmers could afford such technology and choices in the 60’s and 70’s (Dhanagare, 137). One study (1983) based on three regions of the Punjab, taking into account social stratification and different agricultural conditions, found that technology expenses were inversely proportional to land size (Dhanagare, 138). Therefore the rich had less expense per unit of land, on top of having enough money to act as capital in the first place. However, smaller farmers in Punjab, not just rich peasants, took a risk on using the new seed technology. In spite of initial higher costs, they tried to improve their condition. At the same time they hurt their chances of success due to spending more on renting machine services compared to large farms. Even though economic value produced per acre was roughly the same, the small farms had to compete with other farms that were, on average, twenty times bigger in size (Dhanagare, 139). In spite of taking risks, they faced great odds, including market unfairness. The government also had no economic reason to pay attention to them over large farms because of the wealthier being able to produce more, but it may have claimed to be aiding small farmers the most. The bureaucracy concentrated on perennially irrigated regions which could already handle themselves, as opposed to regions relying on rainfall, creating further economic divides, such as in Tamil Nadu. Poor peasants in wet regions ended up with higher wages than those in dry regions. The Green Revolution further made upward mobility difficult because peasants lost their status due to land eviction, becoming landless laborers. Thus members of that part of the population were at risk of losing what status they had, let alone becoming part of social change. For those who could participate, farm machine over-saturation resulted in extra accidental casualties (Dhanagare, 141). The government refused support by not using the Compensation Act adequately, such as not paying insurance in full, in contrast to other kinds of situations. In this way, any claims of small farmer support did not take place in actuality. Poorer farmers also had more difficulty with the disease-prone HYV seeds, such as poisoning incidents by unsafe pesticides taking place more than on richer farms, as in Gujarat (Dhanagare, 142). Likewise, the government offered little in the way of aid, in spite of supposed legal protection.
Government promotion of Eucalyptus trees negatively impacted agriculture due to poor planning. The National Commission on Agriculture changed tree-planting strategies to growing them on farm boundaries and compact blocks for market sale (Saxena, 420). In this way it attempted to create a new consumer product to enrich farms beyond subsistence. Supply gains in the 1980’s and majority tree survivability lowered the price of poles and stabilized their market price, presumably creating a good commodity for farmers to sell. Demand had also increased because of the tree’s straight trunk and low space needs. However, enthusiasm waned by 1986 due to the price of resulting products falling too low and that the trees took soil which could have been used for crops (Saxena, 421). The government had thrown its weight behind a project which proved short-lasting. Eucalyptus was also grown in the semi-arid west and north because of the state of commercial agriculture in those regions, even though the east was more conductive to such tree growth (Saxena, 422). Instead of helping to develop more regions of India, the government attempted to favor typical economic targets in order to increase short-term gains, even in spite of non-ideal weather. However the lowland areas of the west and south also chose it to replace cash crops such as cotton because of labor shortages. Farmers could plant them while pursuing non-farm activity for their main income, which seemed to point to its capacity for uplifting them. The government further subsidized poor districts to plant them on land that could not be farmed in further pursuit of the idea. However, eventually farmers in other regions shifted back to annual crops, because it represented a larger income and trees had a long gestation time. Poorer regions relying on grain and subsistence also could not afford to diversify to them, so they could not participate in such activities. On top of weather difficulties, mono-cropped villages typically went without cattle herders, exposing seeds to trampling, and so adding too much economic risk (Saxena, 423). Low-cost wood sources on private lands were restricted by the government to prevent theft, taking away a more convenient supply source as opposed to other strategies. Traders favored the central bureaucracy, so farmers did not get as good of a price on products as they could have. The government had a prime opportunity to help who it claimed to, but instead it allowed markets it opened for them to become blocked. Quality of wood eventually decreased due to dense planting, poor-quality seeds being allowed to be planted by the forest department and private nurseries, and hybrid seeds suffering from genetic deterioration (Saxena, 424). In an environmental sense the government further sabotaged its own efforts at creating a consumer market. The supply of poles increased, whereas timber and pulpwood products continued to be in demand, resulting in pole demand decreases. In this way the government put undue attention on Eucalyptus, which could only create a limited range of products, over other tree types. Further market issues involved farmers largely having to let buyers come to them due to legal restrictions on the transportation of wood, which created supply uncertainty. Clearly outdated legal codes stayed active, further hurting the market. In venturing into this project, the government created many more social issues than income opportunities for farmers. On top of this, the project reduced agricultural output exponentially in the 1980’s, which farmers were not informed of. Much of the problem could have been prevented if the government had looked at successful examples and took on the project in regard to minding details. Districts of Tamil Nadu, for example, reduced environmental side-effects by planting trees both in and around rice bunds, which also improved soil fertility. Farmers paid herders to pen cattle in the summer, while leaving goats out as fertilizers. The Agriculture and Forest Departments also competed and debated over land use (Saxena, 425). Unresolved issues in watershed management over disagreements on using agroforestry led to ineffective Eucalyptus planting operations. These problems could have been resolved if both departments worked together and reviewed facts, such as how many trees a plot could handle before soil damage, but instead they fought in a purely political way.
Agricultural revolution in India generally fell short of its goals, and exacerbated social and environmental problems. Choices made by the government promoted states which were already the strongest economically, to the neglect of others. In spite of raw, short-term output gains, eventually natural problems such as water well overuse caught up with the results. This increased utilities costs, on top of environmental damage. Even if policies did not generate issues such as riots, they did not aid in creating solutions to them. Farm cooperatives dealt similar kinds of damage on a social level. The government created them to act as a secure membership system for laborers as aid, but it ended up empowering big farmers because of their economic status. The lowest castes suffered greatly and actually lost wealth, with exceptions to the rule in regards to slightly higher castes involving qualifications. Mainly the wealthy and middle farmers benefitted, and the example of the Patidars especially highlights this. Villages and their high-class controllers operated to fulfill themselves regardless of cooperative presence as well. Dairy organizations perhaps fared better. However, they were mainly concentrated in western India, limiting their ability to effect social change, and they were known for ineffective management. The National Dairy Development Board generated criticism with claims that it could not back up, and held vacillating stances on strategies and issues. Operation Flood II further had its own methods which did not necessarily help the poor and created inter-cooperative competition unnecessarily. In the 90’s Amul had its own controversy about how much it actually supported the poor, just as Anand cooperatives in general had restrictive by-laws in the 80’s. However, other cooperatives have been capable of breaking with politics, providing real ownership to members, aiding in projects and making capital investments. The government has been an obstacle to an extent in regards to their true flourishing as well. HYV seed introduction and technology served as another means of keeping the poor fixed in their position. Even though small farms had roughly the same economic output per acre as bigger farms, they were disadvantaged in every way, from expenditure per acre of land, to credit rates offered. The great odds could not be surmounted by their willingness to take investment risks. Eucalyptus tree promotion acted as another attempt to help such farmers. However, they were planted in areas which were not conductive to Eucalyptus growth, and appeared mainly in economically developed regions. Poor regions often could not afford to diversify into trees. Eventually, farmers gave it up amidst soil destruction and crop space-taking, long gestation times, and government policies restricting the market, amongst other reasons. The government largely destroyed a market it wanted to create by its own actions and unchanging laws.
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